The Frustration of Arms Control
Notes for the 1995 ICUNP Conference

1. If START II is ratified in 2003, and there is now a serious doubt about Russia's decision, the number of strategic weapons in the US-Russia combined arsenals will be about 6500, or roughly what it was in 1969. This is a measure of the progress of 34 years of arms control and disarmament, i.e. zero reduction from the date when current arms reductions began. Now the Republican-dominated U.S. Congress is also calling for a refusal to ratify START II, to scrap the 1972 ABM Treaty, and scuttle the Comprehensive Test Ban by permitting "small underground tests", also supported by the Clinton administration.

2. Even if START II was ratified, the warheads from the reduced number of missiles will still be available as they are to be stored.

3. The decision to agree to a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) does not mean the end of new weapons development or refinement. Computer simulations and other non-destructive testing will still be permitted and therefore the qualitative nuclear arms race will continue. As well, the US has opened the door to resume testing under conditions of a national security circumstance. One can be sure the other weapons states will also have such an opting-out clause. Even more pernicious is the Clinton administration's support for a new and very costly substitute for underground testing, "to demonstrate the capability to fabricate and certify weapon types in the existing stockpile," and, "to maintain the capability to design and certify new warheads" (U.S. Defense Department Nuclear Posture Review, 1994). This is a clear violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

4. In some ways the nuclear weapons problem has become more serious. Russia, for example, had a no-first use policy which was abandoned in November 1993 to match NATO, of course.

5. A total of 13 states recently denounced the so-called "consensus" decision for the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including Egypt, Malaysia, Nigeria and Indonesia.

6. NPT allows non-nuclear weapons states like Canada to deploy nuclear weapons on their sovereign territory.

7. NPT allows uranium producers like Canada to supply uranium to nuclear weapons states without any power to prevent its use directly and indirectly in nuclear weapons.

Copyright  © 1996, Fred Knelman
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